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Abstract
In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for funds
has on the risk-taking behavior of laboratory portfolio managers operating under
the typical contractual arrangements offered to hedge fund managers. We find
that such a competitive environment and contractual arrangement lead, both in
theory and in the lab, to inefficient risk taking behavior on the part of portfolio
managers. We then study various policy interventions, obtained by manipulating
various aspects of the competitive environment and the contractual arrangement
of fund managers, e.g., the transparency of the contracts offered, the risk sharing
component in the contract linking portfolio managers to investors, etc. While all
these interventions would induce portfolio managers, at equilibrium, to efficiently
invest funds in safe assets, we find that, in the lab, transparency is most effective in
incentivising managers to do so. Finally, we document a behavioral “Other People’s
Money” effect in the lab, where fund managers tend to invest the funds of their
investors in a more risky manner than their own money, even when it is not in the
investors’ interest nor in the managers’ incentives to do so.
1 Introduction
One issue of prominence these days is what many consider to be an excessive amount of
risk taking in financial markets. What distinguishes these markets from others is the fact
that in these markets portfolio managers must compete for the right to invest other peo-
ples’ money. In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for
funds has on the risk-taking behavior of laboratory portfolio managers operating under
the typical contractual arrangements offered to hedge fund managers. We construct a
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simple laboratory market for capital among portfolio managers where each manager offers
a contract that shares a stylized version of various features that are commonly observed
in real-world hedge fund markets. More precisely, the investor is not well-diversified
across funds, the hedge fund manager’s investment strategy is opaque, and the manage-
rial contract is characterized by option-like compensation scheme according to which the
manager receives (most of) the compensation only for returns in excess of pre-specified
strike price (the details of this contract are described in Section 1.2).
In the simple model underlying our experiment, excessive risk taking is a feature of the
equilibrium: the interaction between the competition for funds and the option-like con-
tract for the manager leads to the inefficient outcome. Different policy interventions
aimed at limiting risk taking on the part of managers do, in theory, rectify this result.
We investigate several of these, which modify independently the competitive environment
of fund managers and their contractual arrangements. More specifically, in one interven-
tion (the Transparency treatment) we manipulate the competitive environment of fund
managers by imposing transparency on their investment strategy; that is, by forcing the
manager to announce (and commit to) the risk level of its intended investment before the
investor invests. In a second intervention (the Risk Sharing treatment), we modify the
managerial contractual incentive compensation scheme to require complete risk sharing
between the manager and the investor. Finally, in a third intervention (the Restricted
Competition treatment), we also change the managers’ contractual arrangement by cap-
ping the strike price or promised return which managers can offer investors to limit how
much competition could unravel.
In all these environments, at equilibrium, portfolio managers should efficiently invest
funds in safe assets. Indeed, all of these interventions prove to substantially reduce risk
taking in the experimental data. In particular, we find that the most efficient intervention
in this respect is the Transparency treatment. However, these interventions fail to reduce
risk taking completely or as thoroughly as predicted by the theory.
One possible explanation for the failure of our policy interventions to completely eradicate
excessive risk taking relies on a behavioral phenomenon: in the frame of our experiment,
managers are not investing their own money and this may lead them to a greater tendency
to invest in risky projects. To investigate this hypothesis, we ran an “Own Money” treat-
ment, which is identical to the Risk Sharing treatment except that in the Own Money
treatment the manager is investing his own funds while in the Risk Sharing he is investing
other people’s money that he competed for. Interestingly, we find that managers tend to
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invest other people’s money in riskier assets than they invest their own money. We inter-
pret this difference as a manifestation of a framing effect, which we call the Other people’s
money effect.1 Indeed, while managers invested their own funds in the risky project only
about 10.2% or 21.5% of the time (depending on the treatment), they invested other
people’s money in such projects 42% of the time in the Risk Sharing treatment. The
Other peoples’ money effect, therefore, represents a quantitatively significant behavioral
inefficiency induced by competition for funds in our hedge fund laboratory.2 In other
words, the excessive risk taking we observe in this paper may stem from two sources.
The first is the natural result of competition in which excessive risk raking is a feature
of the equilibrium. The second may be an Other people’s money effect where subjects
behave in an excessively risky way because they are not investing their own money.
Our paper, adds to the literature in a number of ways. To begin with, we are one of
the very few papers that look at an evironment where different contractual arrangements
interact with various aspects of competition in a financial market. In this respect the
closest to our analysis is Asparouhova-Bossaerts-Copic-Cornell (2011) which also studies
theoretically and experimentally competition in portfolio management. In this paper,
however, the contractual environment is fixed and managers are paid a constant fraction
of the funds they collect, independently of performance. On the other hand, others have
investigated the impact of contracts on the behavior of agents in financial makets; see,
e.g., Levitt and Syverson (2008), who look at contracts in real estate markets; and Ou
and Yang (2003), Palomino and Prat (2003), He and Xiong (2010), and Chevalier and
Ellison (1999), who investigate contracts for portfolio managers. None of these papers
however integrate competition into their models, studying instead one person contracting
environments.
A few related papers study experimentally the risk attitudes of subjects towards other
people’s money. Specifically, Brennan-Gonzales-Guth-Levati (2008) and Chakravarty-
Harrison-Haruvy-Rutstrom (2011) examine both risk attitudes of laboratory subjects
towards their own uncertain payoffs as well as the uncertain payoffs of other subjects,
finding a weaker dependence from the risk of the other subjects’ payoffs than their own.3
1After the title of the 1991 Norman Jewison movie, with Danny De Vito.
2The Other people’s money effect is consistent with the fact that hedge fund performance appears to be
positively linked only to measures of the overall pay-performance sensitivity of managerial incentive pay
(the overall ”delta”), which include private ownership; see Agarwal-Daniel-Naik (2008). While private
ownership requirements are included in incentive contracts to align the manager’s and the investors’
objectives, they might also have the effect of limiting the Other people’s money effect.
3Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010), with a similar experimental design, find an opposite effect: agents
handling other peoples’ money behave in a more loss-averse manner and take less risks for their clients.
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The focus of the analysis of these papers is the social preferences of their subjects: the
decision makers who make decisions for others are not incentivized to do so. We study
instead the behavior of subjects who compete for funds and then invest them, fully incen-
tivised to do so to maximize payoffs. In our paper, therefore, the Other peoples’ money
effect is a behavioral phenomenon, a specific form of framing, rather than a consequence
of a specific form of social preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief institutional introduction to hedge funds, in
Section 2, we present a simple model of a market for capital and we prove some simple
results about the equilibria of such markets. The capital markets in the model share
some features of the capital markets in which hedge funds compete. The objective of the
model, however, is to capture only some stylized features of these markets, and hence we
abstract from several institutional details which might affect in a relevant manner the
allocation of funds in these markets. We then introduce, in Section 3, our experimental
design, mapping the model into a simple laboratory market. In Section 4 we present the
results of our experiment. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The market for capital
To put our analysis in its proper context, we first introduce briefly some relevant in-
stitutional aspects which characterize the market for capital and, in particular, hedge
funds.
2.1 Hedge funds
Hedge funds are largely unregulated investment funds which, in the last twenty years have
become increasing important in the capital markets. At its peak in the summer 2008,
the hedge fund industry managed around $2.5 trillion, according to Aima’s Roadmap
to Hedge Funds, Inechen-Silberstein (2008).4 Hedge funds typically compete for insti-
tutional and wealthy investors, requiring a substantial minimal investment tranche to
participate in the fund (thereby imposing substantial diversification costs to investors).
Moreover, hedge funds are characterized by their investment strategies and by the incen-
tive schemes their managers are compensated with.
The investment strategies and styles of hedge funds are generally opaque, and are not
revealed to investors. In other words, fund managers compete for investors in this market
4The first hedge fund was apparently founded by A.W. Jones, a sociologist and financial journalist,
in 1949. In the 1990’s, however, the industry was managing about $50 billions; see Malkiel-Saha (2005).
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by signalling skills through past performance and through their incentive compensation
scheme. Managers’ compensation includes typically a small management fee (propor-
tional to the investment tranche, of the order of 1− 2%) and a larger performance fee, of
the order of 15− 25% of returns exceeding the ”high-water mark” (the maximum share
value in a pre-specified past horizon).5 This incentive compensation scheme is equivalent
to a call option with the ”high-water mark” as strike price. Furthermore, the manager is
subject only to limited liability, while it is relatively standard in the industry to require
that a substantial fraction of the managers’ private capital be heavily invested in their
own fund.6
Option-like contracts, like those common in the hedge fund industry, are designed to
signal managerial skills,7 but also induce managers to take high risks.8 A large empirical
literature has documented that, in fact, i) hedge funds returns contain a significant excess
risk-adjusted return due to managerial skills (or ”alpha”),9 ii) hedge fund returns are sig-
nificantly riskier than other investment forms (e.g., mutual funds).10 In particular, even
though hedge fund returns display a low correlation with stock market indices, they are
characterized by exceptionally large cross-sectional range and variation.11 Furthermore,
the attrition rate of hedge funds in the market is very high (over 50% in 5 years from the
90s).12
2.2 A simple model
The type of markets we are interested in are the capital markets in which hedge funds
compete for capital. In such markets typically,
5A norm in the market seems to be ”2/20” contracts: 2% management and 20% performance fee.
6See Fung-Hsieh (1999) and Goetzmann-Ingersoll-Ross (2001) for rich institutional details on the
hedge fund industry.
7See, however, Foster-Young (2008) for a theoretical result suggesting lack of separation along the
skill dimension in these contractual environments.
8More precisely, a rational portfolio manager facing a dynamic option-like contract will be lead to take
extreme risk while the fund is below water (its return below the ”high-water” mark), while he will invest
more safely when just above water. See e.g., Carpenter (2000), Goetzmann-Ingersoll-Ross (2001), and
Jackwerth-Hodder (2006) for the supporting portfolio choice theory; but see also Panageas-Westerfield
(2007) for different results with infinite horizon.
9See Edwards-Caglayan (2001).
10See Brown-Goetzmann-Park (2001).
11See Brown-Goetzmann (2001) and, especially, Malkiel-Saha (2005).
12Even after accounting for survivor (and other related) bias, hedge funds paid (geometric) average
returns 2% in excess of mutual funds in the period 1996 − 2003; see Malkiel-Saha (2005), Table 3 − 4.
See also Liang (2000) and Amin-Kat (2002).
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i) the size of the investment per investor is fixed, say $1 ($million, typically);
ii) the hedge fund manager receives a share, β, of all profits made above a ”high-water
mark”/strike price, w;13 if the funds are lost, the hedge fund manager is not liable,
that is, he/she only shares the upside risk in the contract and not any downside.
iii) the fund manager is under no requirement to offer the investor any specific informa-
tion about her fund’s investment strategy.
More precisely, when β, and w are as described above and R is the return earned by the
fund in any given year, the cash flow accruing, respectively, to the investor (Πinvestor) and
the hedge fund manager (Πmanager) can be written as follows:
Πmanager = βmax(0, R− w)
Πinvestor = min(R,w) + (1− β) max(0, R− w)
2.3 Contractual environments
Consider a world with two hedge fund managers and one investor. The investor possesses
a $x-chip to be invested, which the managers compete for. The manager who is successful
in attracting the chip can invest it in one of two projects, called safe and risky.
The return on the safe project is a dichotomous random variable paying Rs > 0 with
probability 0 < ps < 1, and 0 otherwise. The return on the risky project is also a
dichotomous random variable paying Rr > Rs > 0 with probability 0 < pr < ps < 1,
and 0 otherwise. Note that the risky project, has a higher return when successful with
respect to the safe asset; but the probability of success is higher for the safe asset. We
assume however that the safe payoff has a higher expected return,
psRs > prRr
This assumption is called for, because we want to study the case in which investing in
the risky asset is a dominated choice, absent the moral hazard implicit in the hedge fund
manager’s intermediation of funds.
We consider several alternative contractual environments (interventions) in which the
hedge fund managers compete for the investor’s funds. Each contract environment will
13We abstract from small fixed fees, which possibly have little effect on risk taking in practice in hedge
fund markets.
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serve as a treatment in our experiment. To avoid considering a multi-dimensional com-
petition problem, we consider the following extreme cases.
1. Baseline (hedge fund) contract. In this contract β is fixed = 1 and the managers
compete for funds by choosing the water mark, w.
2. Risk Sharing contract. In this contract, in contrast to the hedge fund contract
above, w is fixed = 0 and managers compete by offering different shares β of the
proceeds of their investments.
3. Transparency contract. This contract is identical to the hedge fund contract (β = 1
and managers compete by setting w), except that when competing for funds, the
manager is required to publicly commit to the project the funds will be invested in.
Hence, an offer in this treatment is a pair (w, safe) or (w, risky). (This implicitly
assumes the investment is verifiable).
Finally,we also study a contractual environment in which a legally binding condition
restricts the hedge fund managers’ offers,
4. Restricted contract. This contract is again identical to the hedge fund contract (β
= 1 and managers compete by setting w) except for the fact that we place an upper
bound, x¯, on the w′s that can be offered and hence require require w ≤ x¯
In any of the contractual environments described, after observing either w or β, depend-
ing on the contractual environment, the investor decides which manager to invest his
funds ($x) with. The manager, before knowing if she will receive the funds decides which
project, safe or risky, to invest them into. The manager who has received the funds will
then go ahead and invest them as decided. After all investment decisions are made, the
cash flow is realized and payoffs determined.
We specify these various contracts because we will be interested in how they affect the
performance of the market for other people’s money. As the propositions below indicate,
these contracts can have a significant impact on the risk taking of managers and the
subsequent welfare of our agents.
2.4 Equilibria
We now study equilibria in the different contractual environments.14 We concentrate first
on the basic hedge fund contract, our baseline.
14See Matutes-Vives (2000) for a model of bank competition which resembles, along several dimensions,
our laboratory hedge fund market.
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Result 1: In the Baseline contract, there exist a cutoff w∗ such that, if w ≥ w∗ each
manager has an incentive to invest the funds in the risky project (strictly so, if w > w∗).
In fact, w∗ is such that each manager is indifferent with respect to her investment, and
it satisfies
w∗ =
psRs − prRr
ps − pr > 0
Result 2: In the Baseline contract, if one manager offers w1 and another manager of-
fers w2 such that w1 ≤ w∗ ≤ w2 and w2w1 >
ps
pr
, then the investor will give his chip to the
manager who offered w2. Likewise, in the Transparency contract, if one manager offers
(w1,safe) while the other manager offers (w2,risky) and
w2
w1
> ps
pr
, then the investor will
give his chip to the manager who chose the risky project.
These results state that if one manager chooses the safe project, the other manager has
an incentive to offer a high enough w and choose the risky project. That is, there exists a
risk premium (ps
pr
) such that a rational investor will be willing to leave the safe project for
the risky one. In the transparency contract an investor is able to observe the contract in
which his funds will be invested. Thus, an investor demands a compensation of at least
w2 ≥ w1 · pspr for high risk. In the baseline contract, if w1 ≤ w∗ ≤ w2 then the investor
can infer that a manager that offered w1 will invest in the safe project and a manager
that offered w2 will invest in the risky project (see result 1). Since
ps
pr
w∗ < Rr a deviation
on the part of a manager to the risky project is always feasible. This is the case under a
regularity condition bounding the relative return of the safe project, a condition satisfied
by the parametrization of the game we take to the lab.
It is now straightforward to show, by a Bertrand competition argument, that
Proposition 1: In the Baseline contract, at equilibrium, both hedge fund managers offer
w = Rr and invest the funds in the risky project.
15
Proposition 2: In the Transparency contract, at equilibrium, both hedge fund managers
offer w = Rs and invest the funds in the safe project.
Proposition 3: In a Restricted contract, with x¯ ≤ w∗, at equilibrium both hedge fund
managers offer w = x¯ and invest the funds in the safe project.
15This result holds true more generally, when managers in hedge fund markets compete by choosing
both the share, β, of all profits made above a ”high-water mark”/strike price, w, and the ”high-water
mark”/strike price, w itself; see Appendix 1.
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Proposition 4: In a Risk Sharing contract, at equilibrium both hedge fund managers
offer β = 0 and invest the funds in the safe project.
Note that these contracts lead to different results in the market. For example, under the
Baseline contract, competition forces w up to the level of Rr and all funds are invested
in the risky project. In all the other contracts, however, at the equilibrium the funds
are invested in the safe project with different equilibrium w’s in the Transparency and
Restricted contracts and β in the Risk Sharing contract. For example, in the Risk sharing
contracts where managers compete by offering 1 − β and where w = 0, the only equi-
librium is one involving both investors investing in the safe project and β = 0. In this
contract the incentives of the investors and managers are perfectly aligned so that the
managers should invest the investor’s chip as if he was investing his own money. In the
Restricted contract funds should be invested in the safe project since we restrict x¯ ≤ w∗.
2.5 Parametrization
In our experiments we investigate one particular parametrization of this model. In this
parametrization the safe project has a cash flow of 7 tokens if successful, with probability
.9, (Rs = 7, ps = .9) while the risky project has a cash flow of 10 tokens if successful,
with probability .5, Rr = 10, pr = .5. Without loss of generality, if we restrict w to be in
[0, 10] it is easy to show that, in this parametrization, w∗ = 3.25 and all our assumptions
are satisfied, i.e., 6.3 = psRs > prRr = 5 and
ps
pr
w∗ = 5.85 < Rr = 10. Given this
parametrization we have the following equilibrium predictions for our different contracts.
Table 1: Equilibrium Predictions
Contract Investment β ω
Baseline Risky NA 10
Risk Sharing Safe 0 NA
Transparency Safe NA 7
Restricted Competition Safe NA x¯ ≤ 3.25
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3 Experimental design
Our experimental design attempts to implement the market for funds outlined above.16
The experiments were run at the experimental lab of the Center for Experimental Social
Science at New York University. Students were recruited from the general undergraduate
population via E-mail solicitations. In total 170 students participated in the experiments,
which lasted approximately 45 minutes and students earned on average $20. Each differ-
ent contractual environment represents a treatment in the experiment.
The Baseline treatment is the hedge fund contract environment, which we introduce first.
When subjects arrived at the lab they were divided into groups of three with two man-
agers and one investor in each group. The experiment consisted of 20 identical decision
rounds. In each round the investor was endowed with one ”investment chip”. Each round
started by each manager simultaneously selecting a promised w ∈ [0, 10]. The managers
also choose which project, safe or risky, they intend to invest in. The w’s are announced
to the investor in the market, but not the investment decision, which is kept private.
After both managers choose their w’s, the investor decides who to invest his chip with.
The selected manager then has the right to make the investment that she decided on.
The other manager can make no investment in this round. We ran our market with only
one investor in order to maximize competition and with only two managers in an effort
to minimize the number of subjects needed (and hence the amount of money required).
After the investment decisions were made the chosen project was played out and pay-
offs determined. A successful investment in the risky project paid 10 − w tokens to
the manager and w to the investor. A successful investment in the safe project paid
max {0, 7− w} tokens to the manager and min {7, w} tokens to the investor (the man-
ager is not liable for any loses imposed on the investor).
After each round, both managers observe the w chosen by the other and which manager
received the chip. In case the manager received the chip, she was also informed as to
which project the chip was invested in, the resulting cash flow, and whether or not she was
able to pay the investor in this round. The investor was told whether or not he received
his payment and his profit in this round, but not which project the chip was invested in.
The experiment then moved into the next round where subjects were randomly matched
into new groups of 3 while retaining their role in the experiment, so that if a subject was
an investor (manager) in round 1 she retained that role over the entire 20 rounds. The
16See Appendix for the instructions.
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identity of subjects was anonymous so subjects could not identify other subjects’ roles.
This eliminated the possibility of managers creating a reputation.
In addition to the Baseline treatment, we ran several other treatments each of which
replicated one of the different contractual environments described above. The first such
treatment is the Restricted treatment, for which we pick x¯ = 3. This treatment was run
to check our hypothesis that it is competition, and the heightened promises of returns
it encourages, that lead to risky behavior on the part of investors. Obviously, since
3 < 3.25 = w∗, in this treatment we would expect all funds to be invested in the safe
project. Otherwise, our hypothesis that risk taking is an artifact of market competition
pushing promised returns above w∗ = 3.25 would be easily disproved. In this treatment
all procedures were identical to those of the hedge fund contract except for the restriction
on w.
Our Transparency treatment is identical to the baseline hedge fund contract except for
the fact that in the first move of the game the managers not only choose w, but also
commit on a project to invest in. In other words, they choose a pair (w, Project) where
Project∈ {safe, risky} and each pair chosen by the managers is shown to the investor.
The investor then chooses a manager to give his chip to and the rest of the round is
played out as in the Hedge Fund treatment.
Our fourth treatment is the Risk Sharing treatment. In this treatment w = 0 and man-
agers offer a share 1− β to the investor indicating what fraction of the returns investors
will receive if the project succeeds. If β = 0 then all the proceeds of the investments go
to the investor, while if β = 1 then the manager keeps all the proceeds for himself. This
treatment is conducted using private information (when making their choice investors
observe only the shares both managers propose) in an effort to isolate the impact of the
contract on behavioral and not confound it with transparency considerations.
In all four treatments discussed above when the experiment was over we surprised the
subjects by informing them that we wanted them to engage in one more decision. In this
decision we gave each of them a chip and asked them to invest it for themselves in either
the risky or the safe project. The chip was worth 10 times the value of the chip used in
the previous 20 rounds so this decision was a more valuable one and should indicate how
subjects would invest when investing their own money rather than that of others. This
investment opportunity was given to both subjects who played the role of investors and
managers in the experiment. We will refer to this part of the experiment as Own Money
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(big stakes) treatment.
The Own Money (big stakes) treatment is similar to the ”surprise quiz” round used by
Merlo and Schotter (1999). In this treatment subjects play for large stakes and do so
only once after their multi-round participation in the experiment. The idea is that this
one large-stakes decision should be a sufficient statistics for all they have learned during
their participation in the experiment.17
Finally, we ran an an additional Own Money treatment which we call the Own Money
(small stakes) treatment. In this treatment, all subjects participating in the experiment
performed the role of managers. In each round (20 rounds in total) the manager was
endowed with his/her own chip and faced the same two investment projects: safe and
risky. The task of the manager was to choose how to invest his/her own chip. After the
investment decisions were made the chosen project was played out, payoffs determined
and shown to the subjects. As before, a successful investment in the risky project paid
10 tokens and a successful investment in the safe project paid 7 tokens.
The Own Money (small stakes) treatment is designed to replicate as close as possible the
main features of the Risk Sharing treatment with one modification: managers are invest-
ing their own money (”investment chip”) as opposed to the other people’s money (the
chip received from the investor). Indeed, similar to the other treatments, in the Own
Money (small stakes) treatment the game is repeated (20 decision rounds), the stakes
are of the same magnitude and, finally, subjects have no prior experience with the game
being played.
Given the projects available, at equilibrium, managers invest their own funds in the safe
project. This is the case also, at equilibrium, for the Risk Sharing treatment, in which
managers invest funds received from the investor, because the preferences of the manager
and the investor are completely aligned. Any difference we might observe in manager’s
behavior when they invest their own money and investors’ money, will be interpreted as
a manifestation of the Other peoples’ money effect described in the Introduction.
Our complete experimental design is summarized in Table 2.
17In this sense it is preferable to repeating the Own Money (small stakes) treatment 20 times since in
that treatment repetition may lead to boredom and false diversification.
12
Table 2: Experimental Design
Treatment Competition Information N of sessions N of subjects
Baseline unrestricted only w 2 sessions 33 subjects
Restricted Competition w ≤ 3 only w 2 sessions 30 subjects
Risk Sharing unrestricted only 1− β 2 sessions 45 subjects
Transparency unrestricted (w,Project) 2 sessions 39 subjects
Own Money (small stakes) none NA 1 session 23 subjects
Own Money (big stakes) none NA 8 sessions 147 subjects
4 Results
We now ask whether the predictions of the model is borne out in the lab. Our emphasis
however is not on the model’s point predictions. Rather, as is true in many experiments,
we are more interested in its qualitative comparative statics since it is those that have
the major policy implications.
Depending on the contractual environment, competition for funds might lead the market
to unravel, inducing investment in a risky project when a safe project dominates in
terms of expected returns. This is the case at equilibrium in the Baseline (hedge fund)
contractual environment. The first fundamental question of the paper, therefore is,
1. Do managers tend to invest funds in the risky project in the Baseline treatment? Is
the watermark w they offer pushed up by competition?
On the other hand, all the other contractual environments we study experimentally pre-
dict that, at the equilibrium, managers invest in the safe project offering w’s that vary
with the contract used. The competitive mechanism leading to this outcome is however
different in the different contractual environments. The second fundamental question of
the experiment, therefore is,
2. Does the market in the Restricted Competition, Transparency, and Risk Sharing treat-
ments lead more to investment in the safe project? Does the watermark w respond
to different contractual envioronment qualitatively as predicted by equilibrium anal-
ysis?
The other fundamental question we address in the paper regards the existence of an Other
people’s money effect.
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3. Do managers in the Own Money treatments tend to invest their own funds more safely
than they invested their investors’ money in the Risk Sharing treatment? Is there
an Other people’s moneyeffect?
After establishing the effects of the competition on the risk taking behavior of managers,
we turn to investors’ behavior and ask
4. Do investors choose the manager to invest with rationally? Do they anticipate the
relationship between the return they are offered and the managers’ investment strat-
egy?
Statistical Analysis
To compare how often managers invest funds in the safe project in various treatments we
run the following logistic regression:
yij = α + β · treatment+ ij
where yij is a dichotomous variable taking on a value of 1 if a manager (indexed by i)
invested funds in the safe project in period j and 0 otherwise and treatment is a dummy
variable for the treatment. In all our experiments we used random matching design, in
which subjects were rematched to form new groups in each period. Therefore, we cluster
observations at the session level to allow for correlated errors within the session. To
perform period-by-period analysis we run the same regression for each period separately.
When we report p-values in our discussion below, they represent the significance of the
coefficient β in the regression.
To compare watermarks offered by the managers who chose to invest funds in the risky
and the safe projects in the Baseline and Transparency treatments we use random effects
GLS regression
yij = α + β · risky + ij
where yij is a continuous variable taking values between 0 and 10, risky is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if the manager chose the risky project and 0 otherwise and panel
id variable is the unique identifier of subjects that were managers in the experiments. The
p-values we report represent the significance of coefficient β in the regression.
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4.1 Does the market unravel in the Baseline treatment?
In the Baseline (hedge fund) contract environment, at equilibrium, managers are expected
to offer the highest return w = 10 and invest in the risky project. The key element in this
result is that competition for funds will force w above 3.25 at which point investing in
the risky project becomes rational for the manager. In contrast, in the Restricted treat-
ment, where w ≤ 3, no funds should be invested in the risky project. Hence, our theory
implies that it is competition that is responsible for risky investment since it succeeds in
pushing w above the critical threshold. If funds were invested in the risky project equally
in these two treatments, then the obvious conclusion would be that it is not competition
that leads to risky behavior but, perhaps, some type of risk seeking that arises especially
when managers are investing other peoples’ money. The cleanest way to identify such
market unraveling in the Baseline treatment is to compare the outcome in this treatment
and in the Restricted treatment.
Table 3: Fraction of Risky Investments
All Periods Last 5 Periods
All Managers that received the chip
Baseline 65% 65%
Restricted Competition 30% 32%
All Managers
Baseline 55% 59%
Restricted Competition 31% 31%
As Table 3 indicates, in all 20 rounds of the experiment, in the Baseline treatment
managers invested the funds they received in the risky project 65% of the time, while
this percentage is only 30% in the Restricted Competition treatment (where we actually
predict it should be 0%). Statistical analysis confirms this result: the managers are sig-
nificantly more likely to invest funds received from the investors in the risky project in
the Baseline than in the Restricted Competition treatment (p < 0.001 in all rounds and
p = 0.054 in the last 5 rounds of the game).18 Despite the lack of total conformity to
the quantitative predictions of the theory, we still see that qualitatively that competition
for funds does lead to significantly more risky behavior on the part of investors, as is
predicted.
18The results of the test do not change if we take into account all the intended investments of manager
and not just the periods in which they received the chip from the investor (p < 0.001 for all rounds and
p = 0.007 for the last 5 rounds).
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Figure 1: How often were chips received from investors invested in the risky project, dynamics
A period-by-period analysis of the investment decisions of the managers who received the
fund to invest is even more striking. As we see in Figure 1, except for few early rounds,
most managers in the Baseline treatment choose the risky project. Moreover, the frac-
tion of risky investments in the Baseline treatment is bigger than that in the Restricted
Competition treatment in every single round. In the regression analysis performed for
each period separately, we obtain significantly different fractions in 13 out of 20 rounds
of the experiment (p < 0.10).19
A second fundamental equilibrium prediction in the Baseline treatment is that risk taking
on the part of managers is associated with high-return offers (high w’s) to investors. In
fact, in this environment the theory predicts that w will rise to Rr = 10. Qualitatively,
all that matters in order to observe risky behavior is that the observed w in the market
rise above w∗ = 3.25 since such high promised returns are expected to lead to risky in-
vestments. This is once again the case in the lab data.
19Recall that in each period we only have 11 managers that received funds in the Baseline and 10
managers in the Restricted Competition treatment. Despite the small number of observations, in the
majority of rounds the fraction of risky investments in the Baseline treatment is significantly bigger than
that in the Restricted Competition treatment.
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Table 4: Offers of returns (w) in the Baseline treatment, in tokens
Periods
all periods 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20
Managers that chose risky projects 5.26 4.95 5.13 5.57 5.30
Managers that chose safe projects 4.60 4.23 4.63 4.81 4.86
Table 4 presents the offers of returns, w, for those managers intending to invest in the
risky project and in the safe project.
Note that managers promised consistently, on average, more than 3.25. In the first 5
periods, we observe only 6.4% (7 out of 105) of offers w < 3.25. In the remaining 15
periods this number drops to less than 3%. Moreover, managers intending to invest in
the risky project offer on average higher returns than those intending to invest in the safe
project: managers that chose the risky project offer, on average, a return of 5.3 tokens
and those that chose safe project offer, on average, lower returns of 4.6 tokens (p < 0.001
in the regression analysis).
Notice that while our subjects in the Baseline treatment did not push the promised return
up to their limit of 10, as predicted, they did consistently push it above the threshold
where risky behavior became rational. Of particular interest is the fact that for those
managers intending to invest in the risky project, there seemed to be a great resistance
to offering an w much above 7. Over all 20 rounds there are relatively few subjects who
offered a w higher than 7. Even amongst those managers who attracted the chip we
observe rarely a w above 7 (6 out of 220 cases, less than 3%). This may be true for a
number of reasons. For example, in the Baseline treatment there is a residual 35% of
subjects who invested in the safe project. For those subjects promising more than 7 was
a losing proposition and rarely done. Hence, a manager intending to invest in the risky
project may have believed that it was not necessary to offer more than 7 since there was
a good chance that he would be facing a safe investor who he believed would never offer
more than 7.
In summary, on a qualitative level we find that, as predicted, competition in the Baseline
treatment greatly increases the fraction of funds invested in the risky project and lead
consistently to promised returns above w∗ = 3.25.
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4.2 Do Transparency and Risk Sharing contracts lead to safe
investments?
From the equilibrium predictions of our theory we would expect that Transparency or
Risk Sharing contracts would eliminate risky investment. This would be the case for
different reasons, however. In the case of Risk Sharing, since w = 0, the incentives of
the manager and the investor are aligned. Since the safe project has a higher expected
return, it is in the interest of the manager to invest in it so all funds should be invested
in the safe project.
In the Transparency case it is competition that insures safe investment since the only
equilibrium is one where both firms promise to invest safe and offer w = 7 and, at that
return, there exists no promised return that can induce the investor to want his chip
invested in the risky project. As a result, we would expect less risky investment in the
Risk Sharing and Transparency treatments than in the Baseline treatment.
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Figure 2: How often were chips received from investors invested in the risky project, by
treatment
Figure 2 indicates that these expectations are substantiated by our data. As we can see,
while subjects invested in the risky project 65% of the time over the 20 periods of the
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Baseline treatment (65% in the last 5 periods), the did so only 41% and 17% of the time
in the Risk Sharing and Transparency treatments respectively (44% and 6% in the last
5 periods respectively). Statistical analysis reveals that the fraction of risky investments
in the Baseline treatment is signficantly higher than that in the Transparency treatment
both in all 20 periods (p = 0.001) and in the last 5 periods (p < 0.001). In addition, we
find that the fraction of risky investments is significantly higher in the Baseline than in
the Risk Sharing treatment in all 20 periods of the experiment (p = 0.001), while it is not
significantly different in the last 5 periods of the experiment (p = 0.118). Finally, we ob-
serve far less risky investments in the Transparency than in the Risk Sharing treatment:
p = 0.092 in all 20 periods of the experiment and p = 0.003 for the last 5 periods.
The dramatic impact of transparency on the hedge fund contract is noteworthy since it
indicates that investors in the experiment prefer to have their funds invested in the safe
project and that the excessive risk taking in the Baseline treatment might be ascribed to
investors inability to control how their funds are being invested. Moreover, the complete
alignment of the preferences between the managers and investors (as imposed by Risk
Sharing contract) might not be enough to reduce risk-taking behavior of the managers,
which face competition for funds.
Our Result 2 implies that if one manager proposes to invest in the safe project while
the other proposes to invest in the risky project, as long as the promised return on the
risky project is more than ps
pr
times the promised return on the safe project (1.8 in our
parameterization), the investor should prefer to invest his money in the risky project.
Perhaps one of the reasons why we see so much investment in the safe project in the
Transparency treatment is that while there is a significant premium for risky investment
in this treatment (see Table 5), it is not sufficiently large to induce investors to want to
go risky. For example, note that in the Transparency treatment the mean w offered for
investment in the safe project over all periods (last 5 periods) was 4.43 (4.90) while the
same w offered for investment in the risky project was 5.54 (5.86). While this premium
is statistically significant (p < 0.001 in all 20 rounds and p = 0.046 in the last 5 rounds
of the experiment), it is not, on average, as high as needed to be sufficient to make risky
investment preferred by investors.
In the Risk Sharing treatment, managers that intended to invest in the risky and in the
safe projects offered very similar shares of the proceeds to the investor: about 64% in
all 20 rounds and about 74% in the last 5 rounds (see Table 5). Regression analysis
shows that β’s proposed by the managers who intended to invest in the risky and safe
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Table 5: Average offers of managers, by treatment
Transparency w in all rounds w in last 5 rounds
managers that chose risky project 5.54 5.86
managers that chose safe project 4.43 4.90
Risk Sharing β in all rounds β in last 5 rounds
managers that chose risky project 64.3% 73.7%
managers that chose safe project 63.7% 74.1%
projects were indistinguishable (p > 0.10). Thus, the investors could not infer from the
promises made by managers whether their funds will be allocated to the safe or to the
risky project.
4.3 Is there an Other people’s money effect?
We say that an Other peoples’ money effect occurs if managers tend to be more willing
to take higher risks when investing other peoples’ than their own money. To be precise,
in our experimental set-up, we define the Other people’s money effect as the difference
in the risk taking behavior of managers in the Risk Sharing and Own Money treatments.
In both treatments, in fact, managers’ incentives are completely aligned with those of
investors and theoretically, at equilibrium, we expect to see all funds invested in the safe
project.
Table 6: How often funds were invested in the risky project (all managers)
Risk Sharing Own Money (small stakes) Own Money (big stakes)
rounds 1 to 5 36.7% 23.5%
rounds 6 to 10 42.0% 21.7%
rounds 11 to 15 46.7% 19.1%
rounds 16 to 19 40.8% 16.3%
round 20 43.3% 43.5%
all 20 rounds 41.7% 21.5% managers 10.2%
investors 10.2%
Table 6 presents the percentage of times subjects made risky investment in the Risk shar-
ing and the Own money treatments.20 In the Own Money (big stakes) treatment only
10.2% of subjects (both managers and investors) invested their own funds in the risky
20We used the data from all the intended investments by managers in the Risk Sharing treatment, and
not just the ones that actually got the chip.
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project,21 while they did so 41.7% of the time in the Risk Sharing treatment. In other
words, if subjects have learned anything over the course of the 20 rounds experiment it is
that they want their chip to be invested in the safe project when it is worth a lot of money.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from comparing the Risk Sharing and the Own Money
(small stakes) treatments. Except for the very last round, subjects are much more likely
to make risky investments when they allocate other people’s money (41.7%) than their
own (21.5%). Regression analysis confirms this result: the fraction of risky investments is
significantly higher in the Risk Sharing than in the Own Money (small stakes) treatment
in all 20 rounds of the experimet (p < 0.001) as well as in the last 5 rounds (p = 0.001).
Moreover, if we perform the regression analysis period-by-period, we find that in 16 out of
20 periods of the expeirment, the fraction of risky investments in the Own Money (small
stakes) treatment is significantly lower than in the Risk Sharing treatment (p < 0.05).
Finally, results in Table 6 suggest that the fraction of risky investments monotonically
decreases with experience in the Own Money (small stakes) treatment, while it is rela-
tively constant in the Risk Sharing treatment. The last round of the Own Money (small
stakes) treatment shows the end-game effect: in the last round 43.5% of the managers
chose the risky project, which is two times more than the percentage of risky investments
in the first 19 rounds where average is about 20%.22
Figures 3 and 4 depicts the histograms and the cumulative distributions of the riskiness
of the managers’ investments in the Own Money (small stakes) and in the Risk Shar-
ing treatments. To create Figures 3 and 4 we constructed one observation per manager,
which indicates the fraction of the times he/she invested funds in the risky project over
the course of 20 rounds of the experiment.
Figures 3 and 4 clearly show that managers were much more risky with the investors’
money than with their own. Indeed, 52.2% of the managers in the Own Money (small
stakes) treatment invested their own funds in the safe project 90% of the time or more.
That is, more than half of managers chose the risky project at most twice out of 20
rounds played in the Own Money treatment. The same behavior is rare in the Risk
21Recall that the Own Money (big stakes) treatment was performed at the end of each session after
another treatment. There is, however, no significant difference in the behavior of either managers or
investors according to the the different treatments they previously played (Test of proportions, p > 0.10).
Therefore, we pool together all the data from Own Money (big stakes) treatment and report them
together.
22End-game effects are often observed in the experiments on finitely repeated games. See, for instance,
Reuben and Suetens (2009) and the references mentioned there for end-game effects in the repeated
prisoners’ dillemma game.
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Figure 3: Histogram of how often managers chose risky projects
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Sharing treatment, in which only 13.3% of the managers behave that way. According to
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we reject the hypothesis that the distributions of the riskiness
of the managers’ investments are the same in these two treatments (corrected p = 0.022).
This evidence for the Other people’s money effect possibly suggests that framing the
subjects’ task as a competition for funds leads managers to want to take more risks, risks
that they obviously would not want to take if they were investing their own money. It is
natural to search for rationalizations of this effect in the realm of behavioral economics.
For instance, managers might place other people’s money in a different mental account
than their own (see Thaler (1985), (1999)). In this case, the Other people’s money effect
we document is related to the House money effect discussed by Thaler-Johnson (1990)
and Keasey-Moon (1996).
4.4 How do investors behave?
In this section we discuss the behavior of investors. Our objective here is to understand
if the behavior of investors in our experimental data is also qualitatively consistent with
equilibrium. This is particularly apparent in the Transparency treatment, where the
rational action of investors is not confounded by their beliefs about which project the
manager will invest in. In this treatment, over all 20 rounds there were 172 cases where
both managers chose the same project. In 164 of these cases (95%), investors, as expected,
gave their chip to the manager offering the highest w. In 88 cases, one manager chose
the risky project while the other chose the safe one. In 7 of these cases the risky manager
promised 1.8 more than the safe one and in 5 of these 7 (71.4%), the investors gave their
chip to the risky manager. On the other hand, in 13 cases the safe manager promised
more than the risky one and in all 13 cases (100%) the investors gave the chip to the
safe manager. Finally, in 68 cases the manager offering a risky investment promised more
than the one offering a safe investment but less than 1.8 times more. Here the chip
should go to the safe manager and it did so 58 out of 68 cases (85.3%). All of these
statistics are supportive of the hypothesis that investors behaved as we expected them
to in the experiment. In all of these cases above (except for the 5 out of 7 cases), using
a binomial test, we can reject the hypothesis that the chip was allocated randomly with
a prob = 50%. We observe very similar behavior of the investors in the last 5 rounds of
the experiment, which we omit here for brevity.23
23Available from the authors upon request.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we conducted a controlled experiment to investigate the impact of competi-
tion on the risk taking behavior of laboratory hedge fund managers who operate under the
standard hedge fund option-like compensation contracts. We find that the competition
for funds does indeed lead to an equilibrium where funds are invested in an inefficient
risky manner. Interestingly, this happens in the environment in which the risky asset
has both lower expected return and higher variance compared with the safe asset.24 This
problem can be mitigated by either changing the contract type, restricting the watermark
used in the hedge fund contract or by forcing managers to reveal the projects in which
funds will be invested. We find that the transparency is the most efficient at eliminating
the risky behavior of managers amongst the contracts we consider. Finally, we document
that even when the incentives of the managers and the investors are completely aligned
(as is the case in the risk-sharing contract), the managers tend to invest the money of
others in a significantly more riskier manner than their own.
We stress that, while we couch our discussion with reference to the hedge fund market,
our interests are broader than that since our results hold for any market where firms
compete for funds.
There are several interesting characteristics of the environment in which hedge funds
managers operate that we have abstracted from in this study. One of these elements is
the dynamic nature of the interaction between managers and their reputation. Indeed,
portfolio managers often compete with each other by providing potential investors with
an information regarding their past performance. The reputation channel may by itself
serve as a regulatory device that pushes managers to be more cautious with the risk tak-
ing. Future work should incorporate dynamic interactions between hedge fund managers
and their reputational concerns into the theoretical and experimental framework. One of
the interesting questions is whether reputation by itself can induce portfolio managers to
efficiently invest funds in a safe asset as does imposing transparency.
24This suggests that the effects we found in the Baseline treatment would be even stronger in the
situation, in which the risky asset has a higher expected return to compensate for the additional risk of
holding this asset.
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6 Appendix 1: A Note on Hedge Fund Contracts
As we described in Section 2, a typical hedge fund contract specifies a pair (w, β) which
represents a watermark w and a share β of profits above watermark that managers keeps
for himself. We will show below that,
if β ≥ β¯ > 025 there exists an equilibrium in which all the funds are invested in the
risky project.
We will show that we can sustain an equilibrium in which both managers propose con-
tract with w = Rr, β ∈ [β¯, 1] and invest in the risky project.
First, similarly to the Result 1, if w > w∗ then a manager will prefer to invest in the
risky project because
Πmanagerw,β,safe < Π
manager
w,β,risky ⇔ psβ(Rs − w) < prβ(Rr − w)
⇔ w > w∗ = psRs − prRr
ps − pr
Thus, when an investor gives his funds to a manager that promised w = Rr, his funds
will be invested in the risky project.
To sustain the equilibrium proposed above, the only deviation that we need to rule
out is the one in which one of the managers proposes w = w∗ and β′ ∈ [β¯, 1]. If this
proposal attracts the investor, then it is clearly beneficial for the manager because it gives
him/her positive expected profits, as opposed to the zero profits which is what he/she
earns following strategy w = Rr and β ∈ [β¯, 1]. However, this deviation will attract the
investor only if Πinvestorw=Rr,β < Π
investor
w=w∗,β′ . Thus, to rule out this deviation we need to make
sure that Πinvestorw=Rr,β ≥ Πinvestorw=w∗,β′ . But:
pr ·Rr ≥ ps · [w∗ + (1− β′)(Rs − w∗)]⇔ β′ ≥ β∗ = psRs − prRr
ps(Rs − w∗)
Thus if β∗ < β¯ then for any β′ ∈ [β¯, 1], there exists an equilibrium in which all the funds
received from an investor are allocated to the risky project.
We interpret therefore the assumption that β = 1, which we adopted in the paper, as
a simplification of the analysis.
25In fact, in the hedge fund markets, managers typically keep 15 − 25% of returns exceeding the
watermarks. Thus, we will focus on the situation in which this share β is bounded away from zero.
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7 Appendix 2: Instructions for the Baseline Treat-
ment
This is an experiment in decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make good
decisions, you can earn a substantial amount of money, which will be paid to you at the
end of the session. The currency in this experiment is called tokens. All payoffs are de-
nominated in this currency. The experiment consists of 20 identical decision rounds.
At the end of the experiment, we will sum up the tokens you earned in all 20 rounds and
this amount will be converted into US dollars using a conversion rate of 10 tokens = $1.
In addition, you will receive a participation fee.
Before the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned roles: 2
3
of the
participants will be assigned a role of investors and 1
3
of participants will be assigned
a role of lenders. The role of an investor will be to invest an ”investment chip” if one
given to him by the lender, while the role of the lender will be to decide whom to given
his investment chip to. Roles stay fixed until the end of the experiment. That is, if at
the beginning of the experiment you were assigned the role of an investor (lender) you
will keep this role for all 20 rounds.
In each round, participants will be randomly matched into the groups of 3 people. Each
group consists of two investors and one lender. Once the round is over, you will be re-
matched with other participants for the next round. However, there will always be two
investors and one lender in every group. The investors will receive a participation fee of
$10 and lenders will receive a participation fee of $5.
Decision of the investors in each period.
Each period starts with the lender being given one chip which he/she will lend to one of
the investors in their group. This chip has no value other than providing the right to get
a return if it is invested, i.e. it cannot be converted to tokens. Investors are the ones who
decide how a chip received from the lender is invested and how many tokens the lender
will receive if the investment is successful.
There are two investment projects: Project 1 and Project 2, which differ in the returns
and the probability of defaulting:
• Project 1 pays back 10 tokens with probability 50% and 0 tokens with probability
50%.
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• Project 2 pays back 7 tokens with probability 90% and 0 tokens with probability
10%.
In other words, Project 1 has a return of 10 tokens and 50% probability of defaulting.
Project 2 has return of 7 tokens and 10% probability of defaulting.
Each period starts with the investors making two decisions. First, each Investor chooses
how many tokens he is willing to pay to the lender that lends him his/her chip in case
the investment is successful. Second, each investor chooses a Project in which the chip
received from the lender will be invested. The number of tokens that the investor can
pay the lender for a chip can be any number between 0 and 10 tokens with one digit
after decimal, i.e. numbers like 3.2, 4.6, 5.9, 8.6 etc... This number represents how many
tokens an investor will pay the lender that lends him his/her chip in case the project in
which this chip was invested was successful. If the project in which the chip was invested
defaulted, then both the investor and the lender get zero tokens. Each investor makes
his/her choice without knowing what the other investor from his group chose.
Decision of lenders in each period.
After both investors make their choices, the lender observes how many tokens each in-
vestor promises to pay to the lender that gives him his chip. The lender’s task is to
choose which investor he/she is willing to lend his chip to. Notice that lenders do not
observe which project the investor chose to invest in (project 1 or 2); they observe only
the promises of the investors in their own group. The screen for the lenders will look like
this
Investor A promised to pay back x tokens
Investor B promised to pay back y tokens
It is important to note that in each round, the lender is matched with different investors.
Therefore, it is impossible to track the same investor between periods. For instance, an
investor who appears as Investor A in one round is not the same person as investor who
appears as Investor A in the next round.
How the profits of the investors and the lender are determined.
In any period, an investor that did not receive a chip from the lender will receive zero
tokens in that period.
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If the investor who did receive a chip and promised to pay back x tokens, then
• if the project in which the chip was invested defaulted, both the investor and the
lender get 0 tokens in that period
• if the chip was invested in Project 1 and did not default, then the investor gets
10− x tokens in that period and the lender gets x tokens as promised.
• if the chip was invested in Project 2, did not default and x ≤ 7, then the investor
gets 7− x tokens in that period and the lender gets x tokens as promised.
• if the chip was invested in Project 2, did not default and x > 7, then the investor
gets 0 tokens in that period and the lender gets 7, which is less than what investor
promised to him.
Quiz.
Question 1
Say an investor that received a chip from the lender promised to pay back 7.3 tokens,
invested this chip in Project 1 and Project 1 did not default. What is the profit of the
lender in this period? What is the profit of the investor that received the chip in this
period? What is the profit of the other investor from the same group? What is the profit
is each subject in a group if Project 1 defaulted?
Question 2
Say investor that received the chip from the lender promised to pay him back 4.9 tokens,
invested this chip in Project 2, which did not default. What is the profit of the lender in
this period? What is the profit of the investor that received the chip? What is the profit
of the other investor from the same group?
Investor’s feedback.
At the end of each period investors observe the following information: how many tokens
he/she promised to pay back to a lender that lends him/her chip; how many tokens
the other investor promised to pay back to lender; whether or not the investor received
the chip from the lender; in case the investor received the chip from the lender, which
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project was the chip invested in and whether the project was successful or not; whether
the investor was able to repay the lender what he promised and profits of the investor in
tokens. You will not be told what project the other investor decided to invest in.
Lender’s feedback.
At the end of each period the lender observes the following information: how many tokens
each investor promised to repay to a lender that gives him his chip; which investor he/she
chose to lend the chip to and whether this investor was able to repay the promised return
or not. The lenders are also informed about how many tokens they received in this period.
To summarize:
• At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are assigned roles of investors and
lenders, which they keep for the whole duration of the experiment.
• In each period subjects are divided into the groups of 3 people: two investors and
one lender.
• Each period starts with the decision of investors as to how many tokens they promise
to repay to a lender that gives him/her an investment chip and which project, 1 or
2, the chip received from the lender will be invested in.
• The lenders observe the promised returns and choose one investor in their group to
lend chip to
• The chip received by an investor is then invested in the project of his/her choice as
determined at the beginning of the period
• Payoffs are realized and all lenders and investors observe how many tokens they
receive in this period
• At the end of the experiment all tokens earned in these 20 periods will be summed
up and their sum converted to US dollars at a rate of 10 tokens = $1. In addition,
you will receive a participation fee.
Last part of the experiment.
In this part of the experiment we will ask you all to act as an investor for one period and
make one investment decision with an investment chip which we will give you. Please
choose whether you want to invest in Project 1 or Project 2:
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• Project 1 pays back 10 tokens with probability 50% and 0 tokens with probability
50%
• Project 2 pays back 7 tokens with probability 90% and 0 tokens with probability
10%
After you made your decision, we will roll a 10-sided dice to determine whether the project
you invested in defaulted or paid back. If you invested in Project 1 and dice lands on
0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 then Project 1 defaults and you get 0 tokens. If it lands on any number
strictly above 4 (that is, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9) then you get 10 tokens. If you invested in Project
2 and dice lands on 0 then Project 2 defaults and you get 0 tokens. If it lands on any
other number (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9) then you will get 7 tokens.
Amount of tokens you earn in this part will be converted into US dollars, using the
conversion rate 1 token = $1, and added to your total payment.
Please circle the Project in which you want to invest your investment chip:
Project 1 Project 2
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